Abstract: The research in this paper considers the evidence on the success of alarm reduction strategies reported in the open literature. Despite strong beliefs to the contrary, the empirical evidence suggest that alarm reduction strategies have not been as successful as initially expected. This seems to be due to the fact that alarm reduction strategies actually deprive process control operators of information. In order to determine the ability of people to sift through alarm information, a study of alarm detection with three ratios of target to non-target alarms was devised (i.e. 2%, 6% and 10%) and the information was presented at three rates (i.e. 1 second, 4 seconds and 8 seconds). The results show that the ratio of target alarms has no effect on detection performance, but the temporal rate does. Given that process operators are rarely required to acknowledge alarm information in real time, it is suggested that more emphasis should be placed on initial de®nition of alarms and better presentation methods, rather than attempts to block the¯ow of alarms that have already been triggered.
PROBLEMS WITH ALARMS
The inappropriate presence of alarms can cause substantial problems for the process operator (Woods et al. 1987 ). Typical problems are the avalanche of alarms during a major transient or shift in operating mode, standing alarms, alarm in¯ation, nuisance alarms, and alarms serving as status messages (Stanton and Baber 1995; Woods et al 1987; Hoenig et al 1982; Andow and Lees, 1974) . In a major incident, alarm presentation rate may be somewhere between 50 and 300 alarms a minute in a nuclear power station (E. Hickling, personal communication 1992) . This may lead to problems for the operator in being able to identify and respond to alarms that are worthy of attention. Certainly, the limited number of actions that arise from alarms might suggest that there is a lot of redundant information present; for example, Kragt and Bonten (1983) found that only 7% resulted in operator action. The problems appear to stem from the design of alarms based oǹ normal' operation (Singleton 1989 ) and on a`one measurement±one indication' philosophy of presenting essentially raw plant data (Goodstein 1985) . However, a change in plant state would mean a change in what could be considered`normal', i.e. what is`normal' in start-up, maintenance, and shut-down? In addition, the oscillatory behaviour of a variable that is close to its alarm parameter can lead to distrust of the alarm. Hale and Glendon (1987) propose that a shift in con®dence occurs, such that the next time the alarm occurs the ®rst hypothesis the individual will have is that the alarm is a false one. This lack of trust will grow with the number of false alarms experienced. Sorkin (1989) suggests that individuals are regularly disabling warning systems in locomotive, aircraft and process industries. All the examples are from situations where critical events could arise (e.g. potentially lifethreatening incidents). Sorkin suggests that alarm systems may be working against individuals, rather than for them, i.e. high alarm rates, aversive signals and false alarms. The attention-getting properties of the alarm should not overwhelm the sensory channels (Hale and Glendon 1987) and consideration should be given to the`humanplus-alarm' system (Sorkin 1989) . Andow (1983) suggests that diagnosis is often dif®cult, and the alarm system does little to help. Computer-based alarm systems have been justi®ed on a number of counts: more¯exible control and optimisation of process conditions, providing data of better quality and providing better process and management information (Zwaga and Veldkamp 1984) . Computer-based systems, while initially seen as a panacea to the problem, have apparently increased operators' dif®culties. This is due to increased system complexity, provision of even more information, and an increased emphasis on the monitoring task (Hoenig et al 1982) . Zwaga and Veldkamp (1984) note that dangerous process conditions can develop with oscillating alarms, as opertors tend to acknowledge them prior to determining their location. Once acknowledged, certain types of alarm media make it dif®cult to determine`last-up', such as annunciators which go into a steady`alarm-on' state. While this is not a problem if only a small number are present, a large number of alarms makes this search task very dif®cult. Combs and Aghazadeh (1988) argue that serial displays are problematic because they mask alarms, as they build up into a queue and remain unanswered. Certainly there will be a trade-off in design between the number of items on a page and the number of levels of pages in the hierarchy. However, Combs and Aghazadeh propose that parallel rather than serial displays provide the solution. They argue that a parallel display could reduce response time, decrease training and increase process continuity. However, they have not substantiated their claims, and it appears that this is largely a return to the kind of philosophy that underlies annunciator panels or plant mimics, which are not without problems.
With annunciator panels or large plant mimics, it can be dif®cult to detect a new alarm initially if attention is focused on another part of the panel. Once detected and accepted, its status looks the same as any other alarm on the panel so the operator is deprived of sequence of events information. However, with scrolliing text displays on VDUs the operator has no trouble observing recent alarms and the order of presentation, but he or she is not provided with any spatial information about the relative location of these events, and earlier alarms may scroll off the screen. Whether operators would use all of the information, even if it were available, is questionable. Andow and Lees (1974) cited Duncan (1972) , who showed in a study that when seven alarms came up simultaneously the skilled operator appeared never to use more than four, and often only used one. Apparently the operator's skill was characterised by using a set of heuristics which enabled a choice from a small set of alternatives, taking high-probability paths and checking selected readings. Typically an operator might, upon detecting an abnormal condition, identify the present state and extrapolate future states. Thus, operator diagnostic behaviour has three major elements: historical (identi®cation of problem space), futuristic (extrapolation and prediction of future states) and planning (proposing preventive or corrective action). It is not really possible to isolate alarm systems from the rest of the information display system, and operators rely on both to support their activities.
REDUCTION OF ALARMS
From the arguments presented in the previous section it is reasonable to suppose that alarm reduction techniques may alleviate many of the dif®culties encountered. Kortlandt and Kragt (1983) surmised that the limited number of actions following an alarm con®rms that the main function of the alarm system is as a monitoring tool; i.e. the majority of alarms are not alarms in the sense that a dangerous situation is likely to develop without intervention. This creates a danger that the operator may pay less attention to the alarms, and alarms may be mistakenly ignored. Therefore, the proposal to reduce alarms to just those that require intervention seems appealing. The three basic approaches to alarm reduction are ®ltering, conditioning and analysis (Goodstein, 1985) . Filtering systems use logical rules to reduce active alarms in plant transients; e.g., only display the alarm if the pump has been in operation for 10 seconds or longer. Other ®ltering techniques may help to prevent the cascade of alarms by using`intelligent' alarms that summarise the information. Conditioning may involve the introduction of a`hysteresis' around the alarm limit. Thus the introduction of a small time lag would prevent an oscillatory becoming an alarm. Mode-based conditioning may only allow an alarm to be shown in certain operational modes, to prevent alarm ooding in certain systems states, e.g. start-up or shutdown. Alarm analysis may be considered to be comprised of three stages: pre-processing, analysis and display (Herbert et al 1978) . The pre-processing stage concerns alarm validation, the analysis stage determines prime causes and last-up alarms in some plant areas and the display stage presents the results of the analysis. Human factors concerns are whether the analysis should be performed by the human or the machine (Meister 1989). All of the alarm reduction techniques still retain the basic approach of attempting to capture and display`raw' plant information (Goodstein 1985) . That is to say, they follow the philosophy of`one measurement±one indication'. Alarm analysis does move away from that to some limited extent, but introduces some further uncertainty into the adequacy of the analysis; i.e. what degree of con®dence can the operator have in the output?
Most alarm suppression techniques are successful in reducing the`head count' of alarms. Williams (1985) suggests that combining suppression techniques (i.e. ®lter-ing, conditioning and analysis) would probably reduce the number of alarms initiated during plant incidents by at least 50%, but also acknowledges the dif®culties of implementing the suppression regime. These problems aside, a study by Sanquist and Fujita (1989) compared alarm suppression, in an advanced system, with a system without suppression. The advanced display coded annunciator alarm information by colour. Red indicated anomalies that required an operator response. Yellow indicated caution information that required operator monitoring. Green indicated normal status information that required no operator action. No coding was used on the conventional display. In addition, alarm reduction accomplished by a logic scheme reduced the number of alarms by 80%. Their data indicated that there was an increase in workload associated with the advanced display. This was demonstrated in terms of more control actions and a longer time required to bring the situation under control. Sanquist and Fujita optimistically propose that this could be due to more effective diagnosis and operational control. It certainly suggests a possible shift in cognitive emphasis (Wickens and Kessel 1981) , but shows that alarm reduction does not produce the kinds of effects expected. Baker et al. (1985) investigated, amongst other things, a logical alarm reduction system but were also unable to show that this led to better performance. Paradoxically, alarm reduction also reduces the amount of redundant information that is available to the operator, which might, if it were present, be used to enhance performance under certain circumstances. This is because the apparent redundancy of information may hide its usefulness in keeping theoperator abreast of the state of the process and developments therein, as well as aiding the diagnosis task. It appears that alarm reduction involves the operator in more monitoring and searching activities, if performance is to be sustained.
Thus, while alarm suppression certainly appears to reduce the number of alarms present, this`head count' is not the only criterion for success. The reduction of alarms is only a success if it leads to enhanced operator performance according to a variety of criteria, which could include:
. time to diagnosis;
. mental workload;
. number of control actions;
. success of control actions;
. quality of diagnoses and control actions;
.`output' performance;
. detection rates.
From the studies brie¯y mentioned above (i.e. Baker et al 1985; Sanquist and Fujita 1989) , it is suggested that while the`head count' is down the other criteria are not successful, and in some cases appear blatantly unsuccessful. More recent research by Hogg et al (1995) has shown that alarm lists are not effective in enhancing operators' situational awareness during the initial phases of a disturbance. Therefore, one might argue, is there anything to be gained by reducing the amount of information provided? Development of a logic-based alarm reduction system as described by Cortes (1991) claims possible bene®ts such as improved productivity, reduced process down time, reduced operator stress and lower control room manning. However, these claims have yet to be validated.
ALARM REDUCTION STUDY
The study considers two factors at issue: the ratio of alarm to non-alarm information and the rate at which information is presented. Often these two factors are intertwined. By reducing teh non-alarm information the effect is to reduce simultaneously the rate at which information is presented. For example, if 60 alarms are presented in a minute, the rate is one per second. If alarm reduction techniques halve the number of alarms then the rate of presentation will have to become one alarm every 2 seconds. The experiment conducted attempts to determine which of these two factors makes the difference: the rate of information presentation or the ratio of alarm to non-alarm information. Consideration of the literature led to the expectation that increasing the ratio ofalarm to non-alarm information (as could reasonably be expected by introducing alarm reduction techniques) would have no effect on performance, but reducing the rate of presentation would.
METHOD

Participants
Forty-®ve people participated in this study. All were treated according to the British Psychological Society's guidelines governing experimental studies involving human volunteers. The experimental participants were aged between 18 and 45 years.
Design
The participants were randomly assigned to one of nine experimental groups, with ®ve participants in each group (see Table 1 ). This was a between-subjects study comprising two factors: temporal rate and ratio of alarms. A completely randomised factorial design was chosen to eliminate the possibility of order and practice effects. The temporal factor comprised three conditions: one alarm per 1 second, one alarm per 4 seconds, and one alarm per 8 seconds. The ratio factor comprised three conditions: 2% of target alarms, 6% of target alarms, and 10% of target alarms. Manipulation of the factors was conducted to see which one was important for alarm detection performance. The main dependent variable was alarm detection accuracy. 
Equipment
The experimental task was written in SuperCard and was run on a Mackintosh II. participants were required to use the mouse (for the primary task) and two keys marked`S' for same and`D' for different (for the secondary task).
Task
Participants were required to attend to a primary and secondary task. The primary task required them to identify if the message presented in a scrolling text display was one of the target`alarm' messages, or a non-target message (see Fig. 1 ). This was a matching and categorisation task. To the right of the screen a number of alarm messages were presented. To the left of the screen four target buttons and a non-target button were shown. The participants' task was to categorise the top, highlighted alarm to the right of the screen as either one of the targets, or as a non-target. This was achieved by moving the cursor by mouse control to the appropriate button and clicking the mouse control. When the primary task allowed, participants were required to make`same'/`different' judgements about a series of paired ®gures in different axes of rotation similar to the Shepard and Metzler (1971) task, using two keys to respond. The task was to decide if the ®gure on the left matched the ®gure on the right, although it had been rotated. Two keys on the keyboard had been labelled`same' and`different'. After pressing one of these a new rotated ®gure stimulus was presented. While it is accepted that this task is somewhat arti®cial, we do not ®nd people performing the task in exactly this form in the`real world'; it can be argued that it contains some necessary elements for detecting and classifying alarm information, albeit in an abstracted form. Laboratory research of this nature enables experimental variables to be presented, controlled and manipulated in a manner that is not possible in more naturalistic environments. This reduces the likelihood of confounding variables affecting the results but can lead to people questioning the validity of the research. There has to be some synergy between laboratory and applied research for progress to be made, each tackling issues developed by one another. Not all research has to, or can, be undertaken in the ®eld with real personnel. In fact this experiment expressly chose to use non-control room personnel on the basis that the task was simple enough to learn within a few minutes and that basic psychological processes, common to all people, were under investigation.
Procedure
On volunteering to participate in the experiment, participants were instructed to read on-screen instructions. These instruction told them about the nature of the two tasks they would be presented with. The alarm detection tasks required the participants to categorise the alarms at the top of the scrolling screen by clicking the mouse button on one of ®ve buttons to indicate if it was a target, or nontarget, message. They then had an opportunity to practise this task. Following this the secondary task was explained to them, which again they had a chance to practise. Participants were instructed that the primary task (the alarm detection and categorisation task) should be given priority at all times. When they were sure that they understood the task they were allowed to continue with the main experimental phase, where both tasks were presented simultaneously. On completion of the experimental phase, participants were thanked for their time and involvement in the study.
Measurement
Performance of the participants in both the primary and secondary tasks was measured. Data from the primary task was classi®ed in signal detection terms into hits, misses, false alarms and correct rejections, as shown in Table 2 .
The data were transformed into an index of detectability (Davies and Parasuraman 1982) : p(A). The following formula shows the transformation explicitly:
where Y = H/s and X = F/n, n = the number of non-target events, s = the number of targets, H = the number of hits and F = the number of false alarms. The transformation was necessary because different volumes of alarm information were presented in the different conditions, as Table 3 illustrates.
Therefore p(A) represents an index of detectability (Davies and Parasuraman 1982) which was used as a measure of the participants' performance in response to the targets embedded within the non-target information. Data from the secondary tasks was collected; this included response time and errors.
Analysis
The temporal and ratio data from the primary task was analysed in a two-factor ANOVA. The reaction time data from the secondary tasks was also analysed by ANOVA.
RESULTS
The results for the alarm detection task (i.e. the primary task) show that there was not a statistically signi®cant effect for ratio (i.e. 2%, 6% and 10%) of target to nontarget information (F 2,36 = 0.769, p = not signi®cant). This means that reducing the number of non-target alarms, as might occur through alarm reduction strategies, did not improve target alarm detection performance. There was, however, a statistically signi®cant effect for the rate (i.e. 1 second, 4 seconds and 8 seconds) at which alarms were presented (F 2,36 = 3.3387, p<0.05). This means that if people are required to categorise alarms in real time, detection performance improves as the rate of alarms decreases. The temporal effects were further analysed by Scheffe Â's F-test for post hoc analyses. The results show that participants' target detection performance in the 4-and 8-second conditions were superior to the 1-second condition (p<0.05). This is illustrated in Fig. 2 , which shows that p(A) was signi®cantly lower in the 1-second condition. There were no statistical differences between the 4-and 8-second conditions. No interaction between the ratio and temporal factors was found (F 2,36 = 0.016, p = not signi®cant).
The results for the secondary task showed that there were no effects of either ratio (F 2,36 = 1.431, p = not signi®cant) or temporal (F 2,36 = 0.369, p = not signi®cant) probability on performance. Nor were there any interaction effects (F 2,36 = 0.36, p = not signi®cant). This means that participants performed the secondary task in a similar manner, despite the differences that the primary task made on them. The results suggest that workload on the secondary task was held at a constant rate and that the variation in performance was observed on the primary task. This could be analogous to a human supervisory control environment where the secondary task takes the role of a general spatial monitoring task and the alarm-handling task demands priority, as in the occurrence of a disturbance. This provides some contextual reference for interpretation of the results. In summary, the results from the experiment reported here indicate that the ratio of alarm to non-alarm information is not necessarily important to detection performance, but the rate at which it is presented is. It would be dif®cult to determine an absolute rate of presentation to optimise performance because there are so many in¯uencing variables, such as type of information presented, context, other demands, knowledge and skill of the human operator, and so on.
DISCUSSION
This study shows that below a certain presentation rate the quantity of non-alarm information does not impair detection of alarms. This leads to the suggestion that a large reduction in non-alarm information impairs performance (as shown by Sanquist and Fujita 1989 ) and a relatively small reduction makes no difference at all. These ®ndings are largely supported by similar studies in the ®eld of vigilance (Mackworth 1970; Davies and Parasuraman 1982; Warm 1984) . This leads to the supposition that attention would be better directed to other aspects of alarm system design to improve performance.
The face validity comes from the fact that the main psychological features are abstracted from the real-world environment; for example, the spatial rotation task was intended to represent a real-world background spatial task which had the same demand on the operator under all conditions, such as continuously monitoring a power plant. To some extent this was validated by virtue of the fact that there was no statistical differences between performance in the task under any of the experimental conditions. Spatial tasks have been used in this way in other experimental studies (e.g. Baber, 1991) . Modern alarm systems tend to comprise scrolling text displays (Stanton and Baber 1995) . The alarm messages used for the alarm handling tasks were taken from a real power plant, e.g.`TURBINE CONTROL OIL PS FAULTY'. Alarm information is information which demands some operator intervention. Unfortunately in most systems this information is embedded amongst other`non-alarm' information. This situation is replicated in this experimental task. Hollywell and Marshall (1994) used a much more realistic simulation and obtained roughly the same ®ndings, but the study was not so well controlled in experimental terms (i.e. the manipulation of ratio and temporal rate). Despite this, they argue that a rate of 15 messages per minute was comfortable for control room operators, provided that they had no other tasks to perform. Temporal presentation rate has become a much bigger problem with increased use of scrolling text displays. Previously a designer of alarm systems would have had to prioritise and pre-select which alarms to display on an annunciator board. With information technology the designer has the capacity to provide a far larger quantity of information. Given the technological focus of many alarm designers, there is a tendency for them to present the operator with all the available information, believing more to be inherently better. This confronts the operator with a far higher temporal rate of presentation, which they must sort and prioritise.
There are two con¯icting theories of dealing with information overload: perceptual dimming and perceptual narrowing. The perceptual narrowing hypothesis would lead us to believe that people would concentrate on the alarm handling at the expense of the spatial handling task in the conditions of information overload. An alternative theory posits perceptual dimming; this leads to the hypothesis that under conditions of information overload performance more generally would be reduced, but you would not see a focus on one aspect of the task. However, the experimental results show that performance of the background task remains unaffected by the rate of delivery of alarm information. This leads us to discount the perceptual narrowing hypothesis and tentatively support the perceptual dimming hypothesis.
It is likely that the absolute number of alarms presented is a side-track of the main issue, which for the purpose of human factors is: can the operator manage the process ef®ciently and effectively? Therefore, the presence of a large number of alarms may not be a problem if the operator can make sense of them and they do not interfere with the task. The operators themselves may have alarm-sifting heuristics, as suggested by Hollywell and Marshall (1994) . Such heuristics may include scanning down the list, seeking contextual information and searching for transient-dependent sequences. A substantial in¯uence on the successful management of the incident will be how that information is represented to the operator. Therefore, it has been suggested that a more appropriate solution may involve more effort in the initial de®nition of alarms (Usher 1994) , improved methods of presentation (Stanton and Stammers 1998) and the development of advanced support systems (Williams 1985) . In addressing the question of what to alarm, one should consider to whom the information would be useful. Alarms that are of use to the engineer are not necessarily going to be useful to the operator, and vice versa. Typically, these are mixed within the same system, providing the operator with a lot of irrelevant information that could mask more important alarms. Similarly, de®ning thresholds to trigger alarms requires careful ®ne tuning. Unfortunately, plant commissioning can be a hurried process, leaving the operator with many`false' alarms (Bliss 1995) . Presentation of the information may be largely dictated by technological capability rather than human performance. The introduction of information technology into the control room has not always gone hand-in-hand with improved task performance (Stanton and Baber 1995) .
Research into alarm presentation methods has gone on to demonstrate the relative bene®ts of different alarm media, such as speech versus text (Stanton and Baber 1997) , comparison of annunciator, mimic and text displays (Stanton and Stammers 1998) , and representative versus abstract auditory displays (Stanton and Edworthy 1997) . One group of researchers demonstrated the effects of combining alarm media (Selcon et al 1995) . All of these studies have been conducted independently of alarm presentation rate. Stanton and Baber (1995) argue that rather than consideration of single messages it is the alarm gestalt (i.e. the cumulative alarm information) that enables operators to diagnose problems. Provided that the operator has suf®cient opportunity to review the alarm information and time to explore alternative courses of action, presentation rate is unlikely to be of much consequence. This only becomes a real issue when the alarm systems are poorly conceived, such as scrolling text displays which force operators to try and deal with the information in real time. Stanton and Baber (1995) argue very strongly against the use of such systems, on the basis of a psychological model of human alarm handling, to propose that parallel rather than sequential displays would optimise alarm detection performance. These feelings are echoed by other researchers (e.g. Rauterberg, 1999) , who argue that the design and interpretation of the information in context are superior to the deployment of alarm reduction techniques.
CONCLUSIONS
In the design of alarms one should consider who is going to use that information ± is it there for the maintenance engineer, the operator, the incident investigator or the designer of the system? Often different alarms are mixed within the same system, providing the operator with a great deal of irrelevant information that could mask more important alarms. De®ning the alarm thresholds is also important. This is borne against the background where in a major incident, e.g. Three Mile Island, alarm presentation rates can be somewhere between 50 and 300 alarms per minute. This experiment clearly shows the limitations of scrolling text displays. Rather than have things spatially organised, as they were on annunciator panels, alarms are presented sequentially, in time. An alarm designer should determine which alarms to include through an understanding of the task that the operator is trying to perform, and the information required to perform that task optimally.
